Diffuse Harms and Fortuna’s Wheel

A diffuse harm hurts many people a little; a concentrated harm hurts one person a lot. Other things equal, diffuse harm seems less bad than its concentrated counterpart. For example, shortening a billion happy lives by a second each seems less bad than shortening one happy life by a billion seconds (~30 years). But this attractive thought is surprisingly difficult to maintain. Although many problems for such a view are known, a particularly vivid difficulty arises in cases that involve a sequence of social positions, each very similar to the last, such as the Fortuna’s Wheel scenario. In such cases, it follows, from rather minimal assumptions, that diffuse harm is just as bad as its relevantly similar concentrated counterpart. In response, some may wonder whether the parity of diffuse and concentrated harms holds only in these special sequential cases. But it can be argued that the approximate parity of diffuse and concentrated harms extends well beyond such cases. Specifically, it can be argued that in many realistic cases, a diffuse harm will bring about an outcome approximately as bad as a relevantly similar concentrated harm. Diffuse harm is easily underestimated.

Zach Barnett
https://philosophy.nd.edu/people/faculty/zach-barnett/
Assistant Professor
Department of Philosophy
University of Notre Dame

About the Speaker:

Zach received his PhD from Brown University in 2018. He joined Notre Dame in 2023, moving from the National University of Singapore, where he taught for five years. Zach mainly studies ethics, practical rationality, and epistemology, and he hopes that his work is convincing, surprising, and easy to understand. Current research interests include collective action problems, aggregation and risk, and followability of norms. His representative publications include "Rational Moral Ignorance" (2021) in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, "Why You Should Vote to Change the Outcome" (2020) in Philosophy & Public Affairs, "Philosophy Witho